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TRADE CRISIS? WHAT TRADE CRISIS?
Kristian Behrens, Gregory Corcos, and Giordano Mion*
Abstract—We investigate the 2008–2009 trade collapse using microdata
from a small open economy, Belgium. Belgian exports and imports mostly
fell because of smaller quantities sold and unit prices charged rather than
fewer firms, trading partners, and products being involved in trade. Our
difference-in-difference results point to a fall in the demand for tradables
as the main driver of the collapse. Finance and involvement in global value
chains played a minor role. Firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-
intermediates ratios reveal a comparable collapse of domestic and cross-
border operations. Overall, our results reject a crisis of cross-border trade
per se.
I. Introduction
WORLD trade in manufactures fell by about 30% in nominalterms between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quar-
ter of 2009 (World Trade Organization, 2009). This trade collapse was
wide-ranging across industries and highly synchronized across OECD
countries (Araújo & Martins, 2009). The trade fall also exceeded that
of world GDP and the fall that a computable general equilibrium model
or a simple IRBC model would predict (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2009;
Levchenko, Lewis, & Tesar, 2010).
Many explanations for this disproportion have been put forward. Most
of them focus on the supply side: a dramatic trade credit crunch (Auboin,
2009; Chor & Manova, 2010), the disruption of global value chains
(Yi, 2009), or protectionism raising its ugly head again (Evenett, 2009;
Jacks, Meissner, & Novy, 2011). Others involve the demand side: a dis-
proportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods (Eaton et al., 2011),
inventory adjustments (Alessandria, Kaboski, & Midrigan, 2010), or
the postponement of durable goods purchases. In principle, all of these
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mechanisms may have played a role, and only empirical analysis can
discriminate among them.1
Our contribution is threefold. Matching exhaustive data on Belgian
exports and imports by firm-country-product with balance sheet infor-
mation, we first decompose changes in trade values into an intensive and
an extensive margin components.2 Second, we provide a microecono-
metric analysis of the determinants of the trade collapse. Finally, we
assess whether international trade was hit more strongly than produc-
tion and domestic activity. We aim to understand why Belgian exports
and imports fell substantially (by 26.23% and 27.77%, respectively)
and whether it is warranted to talk about a trade crisis—a crisis of the
activity of trading across national boundaries per se.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, using a decom-
position similar to Bernard et al. (2009), we find that virtually all of the
Belgian trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin. Firm exit and
the dropping of products and markets played only limited roles relative
to price adjustments and output scaling. This finding is very robust and
echoes results on the 1997 Asian crisis.3 Nonetheless, it is remarkable
given the magnitude of the recent trade collapse.
Second, we estimate a model of changes in trade at the firm-country-
product level in search of evidence for the conjectures on the causes
of the trade collapse. Using a difference-in-difference specification—
with both halves of 2007 and 2008 (henceforth, 2007S1–2008S1) as
the pretreatment period and both halves 2008 and 2009 (henceforth,
2008S1–2009S1) as the posttreatment period—we estimate the dif-
ferential posttreatment effects of particular firm, country, and product
covariates on the fall in exports and imports. The most important factor
explaining changes in exports is the destination country’s growth rate
of GDP. Had growth rates between 2008S1–2009S1 been the same as
between 2007S1–2008S1, Belgian exports would have fallen by about
54% less than what we actually observed. This result is quantitatively
close to that reported by Eaton et al. (2011) despite a very different
data set and methodology. Another finding is that trade in consumer
durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other prod-
uct categories, in particular, consumer nondurables. Had the fall in
demand across product categories been equal to the fall in consumer
nondurables, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 21% less
than what we actually observed. Once country- and product-specific
components have been controlled for, the remaining contribution of
the firm dimension to the trade collapse is more modest. The Belgian
1 Baldwin (2009) surveys a large number of empirical studies and con-
cludes in favor of demand-side explanations. Bricongne et al. (2009)
examine the margins of the collapse of French trade and find a more severe
fall in sectors that depend more on external finance, and among firms that
default on a payment. Levchenko et al. (2010) find some support for the
global value chain and durables explanations in an analysis of U.S. industry-
level exports and imports. Chor and Manova (2010) find stronger reductions
in U.S. imports during the peak of the crisis from countries with higher
interbank interest rates and in sectors that rely more on external finance.
2 Belgian raw trade data contains a large amount of re-exports. See the
online appendix for details about how we deal with this issue.
3 Bernard et al. (2009) investigate the contributions of the different margins
to changes in U.S. exports to, and imports from several Asian countries
during the 1997 financial. They find that most of the adjustments occurred
at the intensive margin, thus favoring a quick subsequent recovery.
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Table 1.—Changes in the Margins of Total Belgian Exports and Imports, 2008S1–2009S1
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
Total exports (All Firm-Country-Product Combinations)
2008 S1 101.25 18,053 6.62 5.58 151,844 115, 277 1.32
2009 S1 74.69 18,227 6.49 5.59 112,925 92, 221 1.22
(Δ− 1)% −26.23 0.96 −1.92 0.16 −25.63 −20.00 −7.04
Margin’s contribution 2.68% 97.32%
Total imports (All Firm-Country-Product Combinations)
2008 S1 106.10 31,497 3.88 7.02 123,681 118, 747 1.04
2009 S1 76.64 33,576 3.74 6.78 89,855 98, 089 0.92
(Δ− 1)% −27.77 6.60 −3.54 −3.32 −27.35 −17.40 −12.05
Margin’s contribution 1.79% 98.21%
Letting EM and IM denote the extensive and the intensive margins, the total change can be expressed as ΔX = ΔIM ×ΔEM. Using logarithms, we compute the relative contribution of the intensive and the extensive
margins to the total change in trade as ln(ΔIM)/ln(ΔX) and ln(ΔEM)/ln(ΔX). Total imports are in billion euros, and average sales are in euros. See the online appendix for further details.
credit crunch seems to have somewhat affected exporters: differences
in indebtedness and debt maturity can explain up to 33% of the firm-
level fall in exports. Similarly, involvement in global value chains can
explain about 24% of the fall in imports. Although there is some effect
of inventory adjustment on imports, this is limited to the distribution
sector only. In a nutshell, a generalized fall in demand that affected
consumer durables and capital goods more strongly drives most of the
changes.
Finally, again using a difference-in-difference specification, we
examine changes in Belgian firms’ exports-to-turnover and imports-
to-intermediates ratios, as well as exports-to-production and imports-
to-production ratios. To the best of our knowledge, no other study has so
far analyzed the recent trade collapse using firm-level data on both trade
and domestic operations, though doing so is necessary to gauge whether
international activity has been disproportionately hit by the crisis. Look-
ing across firms, our analysis reveals almost no significant differential
posttreatment effects on changes in these ratios. Factors behind the
trade fall affected domestic operations equally. In particular, we find
no explanatory power for financial variables: though exporters indeed
suffered from restricted access to credit, their domestic and foreign
activities were equally hit. Supply-side conjectures therefore seem to
have little explanatory power when used to compare changes in foreign
and domestic operations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II decom-
poses the collapse along various margins and along various country,
product, and firm dimensions. Section III presents our difference-in-
difference approach to disentangle the contributions of firm, product,
and country characteristics to the observed changes in the intensive mar-
gin. Section IV analyzes the evolution of changes in domestic activity
as compared to changes in international activity. Section V concludes.
Details concerning data sources, as well as the description and the
construction of variables, are relegated to the online appendix.
II. The Extensive and Intensive Margins of the Trade Collapse
To gauge each margin’s contribution to the Belgian trade collapse,
we decompose the changes in export and import values along the lines
suggested by Bernard et al. (2009). Exports X in a given period can
be written as X ≡ f c, g x, where f , c, and g denote the the number of
exporters, the average number of countries each exporter sells to, and
the average number of products each exporter ships to each country,
respectively, and where x ≡ X/( f c g) are average sales per exporter-
country-product. Defining ΔX ≡ X ′/X, where X ′ refers to exports in
another period and applying theΔ transformation to the other variables,
we can decompose the change in Belgian exports between 2008S1 and
2009S1 as follows.
Changes in the first three terms are referred to as changes in the exten-
sive margin, while changes in the last term are referred to as changes in
the intensive margin.4 Information about physical quantities exported
allows us to further decompose changes in the intensive margin into
changes in average quantities (q) and unit prices ( p): Δx ≡ ΔqΔp. We
provide more detailed information about how this latter decomposition
is implemented in the online appendix. Changes in imports, ΔM, can
be decomposed in the same way.
The top panel of table 1 reveals that despite a total fall in exports of
26.23%, the number of exporters and the number of products shipped
on average by each exporter to each country increased by 0.96% and by
0.16%, respectively. The average number of countries served by Belgian
exporters decreased by 1.92%. Changes at the extensive margin hence
reduced exports by (1.0096×0.9808×1.0016−1)×100% = −0.82%.
As can be further seen from table 1, changes at the extensive margin are
dwarfed by changes at the intensive margin. Indeed, the average value of
exports per firm-country-product fell by 25.63% between 2008S1 and
2009S1. Changes in the intensive margin are mainly driven by changes
in quantities shipped. On average, Belgian exports by firm-country-
product decreased in terms of quantities by 20%, while average unit
prices also fell, but “only” by 7.04%. As finally shown by the last line
of the top panel of table 1, the intensive margin contributes to more than
97% of the observed change in exports.5
The bottom panel of table 1 performs the same decomposition for
total Belgian imports, which fell by 27.77% across all firm-country-
product combinations between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Observe that the
overall picture is very similar to that of exports: the intensive margin
accounts for almost all the changes, and most of it is driven by a sharp
decrease in quantities. A first conclusion thus emerges: the collapse of
both total Belgian exports and imports was overwhelmingly driven by
a fall in exports or imports per firm-country-product, itself driven to a
large extent by a sharp fall in quantities.
To gauge whether these results roughly hold for all firms, sectors,
and trading partners, we repeat the decomposition by splitting our sam-
ple more finely along various dimensions (for example, large and small
firms, less or more productive firms, ownership status, debt structure).
Such a finer decomposition can provide some first insights into the
key explanations for the fall in trade. As can be seen from table 2, the
4 We have no information on the number of trading partners or shipments
for each exporter per country-product combination. Thus, our intensive
margin Δx still contains some “extensive margin” components that we
cannot isolate.
5 Combining the two margins, the total change in Belgian exports is given
by (1.0096 × 0.9808 × 1.0016 × 0.7437 − 1) = −0.2623, or −26.23%.
Using the quantity and price decomposition, this is also equal to (1.0096 ×
0.9808 × 1.0016 × 0.8 × 0.9296 − 1) × 100% = −0.2623.
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Table 2.—Changes in the Margins of Belgian Exports and Imports, by Subgroupings, 2008S1–2009S1
Total Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Salesa
Subgroups % Change Firms Countries Products Contribution Sales Contribution Quantities Prices
Product classificationsb
Exports class. as ‘Other goods’ −21.03 1.09 −1.35 −0.52 3.39% −20.39 96.61% −11.29 −10.26
Exports class. as ‘Interm., Capital, & Dura.’ −28.98 1.32 −2.60 0.50 2.40% −28.40 97.60% −24.10 −5.66
Imports class. as ‘Other goods’ −25.64 6.42 −1.94 −3.96 −0.77% −25.80 100.77% −11.02 −16.61
Imports class. as ‘Interm., Capital, & Dura.’ −29.17 5.36 −3.18 −3.03 3.14% −28.40 96.86% −23.45 −6.46
Regional components
Exports to EU member states only −26.06 1.43 −3.07 0.00 5.62% −24.79 94.38% −19.23 −6.88
Exports to OECD non-EU countries −27.70 1.32 −1.68 4.18 −11.43% −30.33 111.43% −34.94 7.09
Exports to non-OECD non-EU countries −26.22 0.68 −0.93 0.32 −0.20% −26.27 100.20% −10.96 −17.19
Firm typesc
Exports by small firms −20.52 −2.44 1.14 2.31 −4.13% −21.27 104.13% −23.96 3.54
Exports by large firms −27.35 0.72 −2.86 3.46 −3.82% −28.23 103.82% −23.44 −6.25
Imports by small firms −12.80 1.51 0.30 −0.59 −8.76% −13.84 108.76% −10.31 −3.93
Imports by large firms −30.46 0.62 −1.40 −2.02 7.79% −28.46 92.21% −16.48 −14.35
Ownership structured
Imports by nonmultinational firms −23.34 1.92 −1.40 −2.12 6.17% −22.07 93.83% −15.80 −7.45
Imports by multinational firms −36.61 2.14 −1.84 −3.64 7.58% −34.38 92.42% −17.48 −20.49
Imports by non-foreign-owned firms −19.91 2.06 −1.45 −2.41 8.35% −18.41 91.65% −10.31 −9.03
Imports by foreign-owned firms −34.57 −0.45 0.16 −1.55 4.36% −33.35 95.64% −22.46 −14.04
Debt structuree
Exports, low share of debts over liabilities −24.53 0.27 −1.36 3.08 −6.91% −25.98 106.91% −23.25 −3.56
Exports, high share of debts over liabilities −29.72 −1.55 −1.06 0.68 5.52% −28.34 94.48% −21.78 −8.39
Exports, low share of financial debts −24.25 −0.70 −0.72 2.27 −2.95% −24.87 102.95% −21.97 −3.72
Exports, high share of financial debts −29.36 −0.72 −1.44 2.01 0.53% −29.23 99.47% −23.21 −7.84
See section II for additional details on the decomposition performed. All figures are expressed in terms of percentage changes. We report results for both exports and imports only when the results for those two
categories are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficiently different. This table presents only a subset of the results. The full set of results is available as a spreadsheet from the authors on request.
aAs a robustness check (available on request), we also provide an alternative price-quantity decomposition where we only focus on goods reported by weight. Results slightly differ from those reported in the paper.
The reasons are that the total trade of goods that are measured in kilograms has decreased less than the trade of goods measured in units and Belgium trades proportionally more goods measured in kilograms with
non-EU countries.
bThe product classification follows the EU’s Main Industrial Groupings in official statistics, as described in the European Commission Regulation No. 586/2001 (March 26, 2001). This classification separates
products into intermediate, capital, consumer durable, consumer nondurable, and energy products.
cWe define size in terms of employment and small (large) firms as those being below (above) the two-digit NACE rev1.1 industry median size across all trading firms. Information on some exporters and importers is
lost because of the lack of balance sheet data required for figures on employment and other firm characteristics.
dA multinational firm is one registered in Belgium that owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the equity of at least one firm registered in another country. A foreign-owned firm is a one registered in
Belgium with 10% or more of its equity owned by a foreign entity.
eThe ratios are computed from balance sheet data. The share of financial debts is the ratio of financial debts to total liabilities (thus excluding commercial debt). Information on some exporters and importers is lost
because of the lack of balance sheet data.
overall decomposition of margins, while not identical, remains quali-
tatively very stable across all specifications. In particular, the intensive
margin remains dominant, whereas changes at the extensive margin are
uniformly small. The key points worth noting from table 2 are that (a)
trade in intermediates, capital, and durables fell more than trade in other
goods; (b) the extensive margin was more strongly affected for Belgian
trade with its EU partners than for trade with the rest of the world; (c)
larger firms were hit more severely, especially for imports; and (d) firms
with larger debt-to-liabilities ratios or with a larger share of financial
(as opposed to commercial) debt experienced slightly larger declines in
exports. While firms were therefore to some extent affected differently
by the crisis, it is fair to say that the magnitudes of those differences are
relatively small.
III. Firm-, Country-, and Product-Level Characteristics:
The Determinants of the Trade Collapse
We now turn to econometric analysis to examine the various conjec-
tures put forward in the literature and to quantify their contribution to
the fall in trade. To do so, we look at the differential impact of firm,
product, and country characteristics before and after the start of the col-
lapse. Looking at the differential impact is important for the following
reason. If, say, highly leveraged firms experience lower export growth
than other firms even in a normal period, nothing could be learned from
the simple fact that they suffered a stronger fall in trade during the col-
lapse. However, by comparing the negative effect on export growth of
being highly leveraged before and after the start of the collapse—the
collapse being a heterogeneous treatment across firms with different
characteristics—we can infer whether restricted access to credit played
a role during the crisis and gauge its magnitude.
A. An Econometric Model of Changes in Trade Values
We saw that the bulk of the 2008S1–2009S1 fall in Belgian trade
occurred at the intensive margin. Furthermore, “stayers”—firms export-
ing in both semesters—accounted for 98% of both exports and imports
in 2008S1 and 2009S1. Therefore, we can safely explore the determi-
nants of the fall in trade by restricting our analysis to intensive margin
changes in trade among these firms.
The primary data for our analysis are export and import values by
firm-country-product in 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1, as well as bal-
ance sheet data (see the online appendix for more information). We
aggregate the data at the HS4 product level (more than 1,000 product
categories) and consider only continuing triples: firm-country-product
trade triples that record positive values in two consecutive periods
among the three we consider. Our aim is to provide econometric results
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that can make sense of aggregate changes in trade, and focusing on
continuing triples avoids giving too much weight to low-value triples.6
We describe our econometric model for exports only, the one for
imports being identical. Using data on continuing triples, the dependent
variable is the change in (log export values of firm f to country c for
product p,ΔXtfcp ≡ log Xt+1fcp − log Xtfcp, between two consecutive halves
of the year (log export growth between 2007S1 and 2008S1, as well
as between 2008S1 and 2009S1). Using the difference-in-difference
terminology, the pretreatment period (trade collapse) corresponds to
2007S1–2008S1 while the posttreatment period is 2008S1–2009S1.
Together with the posttreatment time dummy variable TCt , we take
as regressors a number of firm, country, and product characteristics that
proxy for the various conjectures to explain the trade collapse, along
with their interactions with TCt . Formally, the estimating equation is
given by
ΔXtfcp = α+ TCt + β
′
1Wtfcp + β
′
2WtfcpTCt + εtfcp, (1)
where Wtfcp is a vector of firm, country, and product characteristics
together with a set of two-digit NACE rev 1.1 industry dummies and
where εtfcp is a residual term with the standard properties for the con-
sistency of OLS. In the case of firm covariates, we use one-year lagged
balance sheet information—2006 (2007) data for 2007S1–2008S1
(2008S1–2009S1) export growth—to somewhat mitigate the endogene-
ity of firm characteristics. Having data that vary along three dimensions,
we follow the procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2011) and apply multilevel clustering to obtain more reliable standard
errors. The coefficients β1 measure the impact of our covariates in a
normal period (2007S1–2008S1), while the coefficients β2 capture dif-
ferential changes induced by the trade collapse treatment (09S1).7 We
are therefore especially interested in the β2 coefficients.
Table 3 lists the covariates we use in equation (1), as well as their
description. All firm characteristics prefixed by D are binary variables,
taking a value of 1 if that characteristic is above the sectoral median
across all trading firms and 0 otherwise. This choice allows us to maxi-
mize the number of firms we can use while reducing the risk of bias due
to measurement error and potential outliers. It also provides us, as in the
case of standardized regression coefficients, with a relevant metric to
compare the contribution of the different firm characteristics to changes
in trade values.
B. Results
Table 3 reports estimated coefficients and standard errors obtained by
OLS from equation (1). We run two separate regressions, one for export
growth and one for import growth. For each regression, we report two
sets of coefficients in separate columns. The third and fifth columns
(“Base”) report β1 parameters for, respectively, the export and import
growth regressions of the pretreatment period (2007S1–2008S1). The
fourth and sixth columns (“DD”) provide β2 parameters: i.e., changes in
the responsiveness of export and import growth into the posttreatment
period (2008S1–2009S1) of the trade collapse.
6 See the online appendix for more information on continuing triples.
We also used (trade) weighted least squares for the continuing triples. The
results, given in Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2011), are almost identical,
thus in what follows, we present only the unweighted results with continuing
triples.
7 The remarkable rise in commodity prices during 2007S1–2008S1 could
potentially affect our results. In unreported estimations, available on
request, we also considered 2006S1–2007S1 as a normal period. The results
are virtually identical.
Firm characteristics. Table 3 shows that firm-level difference-in-
difference coefficients are in general, small and insignificant and that the
model’s explanatory power is very weak. At first sight, our results thus
suggest that (a) the trade collapse has been quite symmetric across firms
within a given industry and (b) some of the supply-side explanations
are likely to play a second-order role only.
We now discuss results for each group of covariates. As indicated by
the positive and significant coefficient of Dsize in the column “Export-
Base” of table 3, exports by large firms grow on average 3.71% faster
than those of other firms in a “normal” year. As further shown by the
coefficient of Dsize in the column “Export-DD,” there was no significant
change in that pattern after the start of the trade collapse. The latter
finding also holds for productivity Dprod . As for import growth, more
productive firms did suffer more during the collapse, though the implied
contribution to the fall is small. To assess the magnitude of this effect, we
can compute the counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 import growth without
a differential effect of Dprod by letting Dprod × TCt = 0. Had firms with
above-median productivity been affected by the collapse as those with
below-median productivity, the overall fall in exports (27.21%) would
have been less severe by 14.74%—4.01 percentage points.
Involvement in global value chains (as measured by the value and
the significance of Dinterm_share, Dshare_exp_sales, and Dvalue_add_chain in the
column “Export-DD”) did not differentially affect export growth in
2008S1–2009S1 as compared to 2007S1–2008S1. This casts doubt on
the hypothesis of a disruption of global value chains. Observe further
that the differential effect of Dshare_imp_interm is actually positive and
significant, indicating that firms with above-median ratios of imports to
intermediates experienced a smaller fall in exports. When computing the
counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 export growth in the absence of a dif-
ferential effect of Dshare_imp_interm, by letting Dshare_imp_interm × TCt = 0,
we find that the overall fall in exports would have been 22.71%
stronger. Turning to imports, an above-median involvement in global
value chains, and in particular Dinterm_share and Dshare_exp_sales, does cor-
respond to lower import growth in 2008S1–2009S1. However, the
contribution is not very large. When both Dinterm_share × TCt = 0
and Dshare_exp_sales × TCt = 0, all else equal, we find that 23.84% of
the overall import fall would not have occurred in this counterfactual
world.
Variables proxying for firms’ financial structure (as measured
by the value and the significance of Dext_fin_dep, Dshare_debts_o_liab,
Dshare_debts_due_after_one, and Dshare_fin_debt) appear to play some role in
2008S1–2009S1 export changes. Firms with shorter debt maturity and
a larger fraction of financial (as opposed to commercial) debt experi-
enced a significantly larger fall of exports during the trade collapse.
Our findings thus lend some support to the trade credit crunch hypoth-
esis (Auboin, 2009; Chor & Manova, 2010; Amiti & Weinstein, 2011).
How large is that effect? Firms with above-median debt maturity experi-
enced a 4.56% higher export growth, whereas firms with above-median
financial debts saw their exports shrink by about 6.68% more. Both
values must be contrasted with the 27.21% total fall in export values in
our sample. Predicting the counterfactual export growth in the absence
of negative financial effects, we find that about one-third (33.06%) of
the 2008S1–2009S1 fall in exports can be attributed to our measures
of finance. It is worth noting, however, that financial variables do not
seem to affect changes in import values at all.8
8 Our variables only imperfectly capture access to credit in general and
trade finance in particular. However, contrary to most other work on the trade
crisis, we use firm-level measures and do not rely on even more imperfect
sectoral measures.
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Table 3.—Export and Import Growth: Firm, Country, and Product Determinants
Export Growth Import Growth
Variable Description Base DD Base DD
Firm characteristics
Dsize Size (in term of employment) of the firm 0.0371∗∗ −0.0305 0.0218∗∗ 0.0068
(0.018) (0.030) (0.009) (0.015)
Dprod Value added per worker 0.0108 −0.0101 0.0391∗∗∗ −0.0425∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.009) (0.016)
Dinterm_share Share of intermediates over turnover 0.0032 −0.0194 0.0071 −0.0279∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.010) (0.015)
Dshare_exp_sales Share of exports over turnover −0.0087 −0.0239 0.0191 −0.0571∗∗
(0.023) (0.054) (0.013) (0.025)
Dshare_imp_interm Share of imports over intermediates −0.0511∗∗ 0.0611∗∗ −0.0280∗∗ 0.0017
(0.021) (0.031) (0.011) (0.014)
Dvalue_add_chain Exports times imports over turnover 0.0309 −0.0148 −0.0507∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.027) (0.049) (0.014) (0.033)
Dext_fin_dep Investments minus operating profits over investments −0.0350 0.0201 −0.0256∗∗ −0.0035
(0.022) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017)
Dshare_debts_o_liab Ratio of debts over total liabilities −0.0168 −0.0178 −0.0055 −0.0066
(0.018) (0.030) (0.010) (0.015)
Dshare_debts_due_after_one Share of debts due after one year 0.0104 0.0456∗ 0.0097 0.0102
(0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017)
Dshare_fin_debt Share of financial debt 0.0209 −0.0668∗∗ 0.0011 −0.0043
(0.022) (0.029) (0.011) (0.019)
Dshare_stock Ratio of stock over turnover 0.0104 0.0234 0.0113 −0.0244
(0.021) (0.030) (0.010) (0.016)
for Foreign firm dummy 0.0181 −0.0444 0.0029 0.0087
(0.026) (0.041) (0.014) (0.029)
mne Multinational firm dummy 0.0114 −0.0255 −0.0304 0.0309
(0.029) (0.038) (0.023) (0.037)
Country characteristics
OECD_NO_EU Dummy for countries belonging to the OECD but not to the EU −0.1561∗∗∗ 0.2790∗∗∗ −0.2988∗∗∗ 0.4841∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.051) (0.037) (0.055)
NO_OECD_NO_EU Dummy for countries belonging to neither the OECD nor the EU −0.0742∗∗∗ 0.1013∗ −0.2255∗∗∗ 0.3854∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.053) (0.042) (0.067)
exch_rate_change % change in the nominal exchange rate with the euro between the −0.2885∗∗∗ −0.1769∗ −0.2988∗∗∗ 0.2463∗∗
end of the first quarter of 2007 (2008) and the end of the (0.071) (0.091) (0.086) (0.101)
first quarter of 2008 (2009)
growth_rate_GDP Average annual growth rate of the country’s GDP between 2007 (2008) 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0056 0.0008
and 2008 (2009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Product characteristics
intermediates Intermediate goods dummy 0.0126 −0.0485∗ −0.0246 −0.0334∗
(0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018)
capital_goods Capital goods dummy −0.0055 −0.0746∗ −0.0393 −0.0218
(0.020) (0.043) (0.031) (0.037)
consumer_durables Durable consumer goods dummy −0.0171 −0.1135∗∗∗ −0.0305 −0.0568∗
(0.030) (0.044) (0.023) (0.033)
energy Energy related goods dummy 0.0944∗∗ −0.1324∗ −0.0409 0.0387
(0.041) (0.075) (0.065) (0.063)
residual Goods not belonging to the previous categories 0.0150 −0.0579 −0.0572∗∗ 0.0239
(0.024) (0.043) (0.026) (0.022)
fraclib_diff Measure of product differentiation (based on Rauch, 1999) −0.0347∗∗ 0.0519∗∗ −0.0255∗∗ 0.0497∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 400,626 506,114
R2 0.0104 0.0091
All firm characteristics prefixed with a D are dummy variables that take value 1 if the firm characteristic is above the NACE rev 1.1 2-digit industry median across trading firms and 0 otherwise. All data sources
and information on the construction of the variables are provided in the online appendix. The “Base” column refers to coefficients of firm, country, and product characteristics alone, while the “DD” column refers to
coefficients of interactions of these characteristics with the trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt . Multilevel clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2011) are given in parentheses. Coefficients are
significant at ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
The difference-in-difference coefficient for Dshare_stock , proxying for
inventory capacity, is not significant for export or import growth. The
latter finding contrasts with the inventory adjustment explanation as
we would expect imports of firms with greater inventory capacity to
contract more, all else equal. Still, one may argue that inventory adjust-
ments occur primarily among distributors. Therefore, we also run the
same regressions on the subsample of firms from the distribution sec-
tor (NACE industries 50, 51, and 52), which represented 40.25% of
Belgian imports in 2008S1.9 We find that imports of distributors with
above-median inventory-to-sales ratios fell significantly, by 3.23 per-
centage points, more than those of other distributors in 2008S1–2009S1.
This coefficient accounts for 11.80% of the fall in imports of the distri-
bution sector. However, we find no effects of stocks in the export growth
regressions. Overall, we conclude that although inventory adjustment
9 Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available on request.
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Figure 1.—Nonlinearities in the Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on
Export Growth before and after the Start of the Trade Collapse
The convex curve (◦) depicts pretreatment coefficients, while the concave curve (Δ) represents
posttreatment coefficients.
accounted for some of the import fall in an important sector, it played
a minor role in the trade collapse in general.
To conclude, note that neither multinationals nor foreign-owned firms
have been differentially affected by the trade collapse. Both the export
and the import difference-in-difference coefficients are insignificant,
lending further support to the finding that there was no major disrup-
tion of global value chains. Interactions of two-digit NACE industry
dummies with the trade collapse treatment TCt , the reference industry
being Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers, are
significant in only nine cases, thereby suggesting that strong industry
patterns are not to blame either.
Country characteristics. We view GDP growth as the key variable
to gauge the contribution of a demand shock to the collapse of exports.
Two results stand out from our analysis. First, the coefficient differs
widely between 2007S1–2008S1 and 2008S1–2009S1. In a normal
period, a 1% increase in the aggregate demand of an export destination,
as proxied by its percentage growth of GDP, translates into a 0.0138, or
1.38%, increase in exports to that destination. Our coefficient is broadly
consistent with standard cross-section/cross-country gravity models in
which the elasticity of trade flows to GDP of the destination is close to
unity. However, during the trade collapse, the responsiveness of changes
in log export values with respect to percentage growth of GDP of the
destination increased significantly (0.0138 + 0.0115 = 0.0253), sug-
gesting that the global recession induced a disproportionate fall in the
demand for tradable goods.
To gain further insights, we consider the presence of nonlinearities.
In particular, we include GDP growth to the powers 2 and 3, both alone
as well as interacted with TCt , as further regressors in our estimations.
Results indicate that there are indeed nonlinearities at work in a typical
year. However, difference-in-difference coefficients reveal that the trade
collapse caused a structural change in the relationship between GDP
growth and export growth rates. As can be seen from figure 1, plotting
the estimated marginal effect of GDP growth on export growth in both
periods, the post-treatment curve deviates more from the 45 degree line
(the unit-elastic benchmark), especially for countries with large GDP
drops, than the pretreatment curve. In other words, exports to countries
hit by sharp recessions dropped disproportionately more, and by more
than in tranquil times.
Finally, we again make use of our model to gauge the contribution
of the demand shock to the change in log export values. To this end,
we consider the counterfactual situation where GDP growth rates for
2008S1–2009S1 are replaced with those prevailing in 2007S1–2008S1,
all else equal. We find that had GDP growth between 2008S1–2009S1
been the same as in the previous period, the export drop would have
been 54.15% less severe. We may thus conclude that more than half of
the export collapse can be attributed to a generalized fall in the demand
for tradable goods. The interpretation of the GDP growth coefficient for
imports, which now refers to the exporting country, is more difficult. Yet
as can be seen from table 3, both the “Base” and the “DD” coefficients
are insignificant. We can still compute the counterfactual decline of
Belgian imports, had Belgian GDP growth remained constant, by using
the coefficient found in the export regression and data on Belgian GDP
growth. We find that 44.65% of the import drop can be attributed to a
fall in demand for tradable goods in Belgium. Hence, slightly less than
half of the fall in imports is due to a demand shock.
The difference-in-difference coefficients of the two dummies for
trade with non-EU countries and outside the OECD are both positive,
sizable, and significant for export and import growth. This means that
trade with countries outside the EU helped to mitigate the trade col-
lapse. In a counterfactual world in which trade growth outside the EU
would have followed the same trend as within the EU, exports (imports)
would have fallen by 20.86% (38.27%) more than what we observed.
The fact that non-EU trade, especially imports, fell less than EU trade
suggests indirectly that protectionist measures played only a small role
in explaining the Belgian trade collapse (see also Eaton et al., 2011).
As for fluctuations in exchange rates, the magnitude of the coefficients
indicates that they have affected exports (imports) more (less) strongly
during the trade collapse period. However, the implied magnitudes for
changes in export and import values are small. From our estimates, fluc-
tuations of the euro can be blamed for only a small share (5.92%) of
the total drop in Belgian exports.
Product characteristics. Our reference group for products in table
3 is consumer nondurables. Therefore, the previous discussion and the
magnitudes of the fall in demand apply solely to this category. However,
in line with the margin decomposition of section II, interactions of
product dummies with TCt for the categories Intermediates, Consumer
Durables, and Capital Goods are all negative and strongly significant in
the export growth analysis, indicating that these goods experienced a
larger fall. As for imports, the same result holds for Intermediates and
Consumer Durables.
What are the causes of such different behavior across product cate-
gories? Based on our analysis, the answer is likely to be a differential
fall in demand.10 Evaluating a counterfactual scenario in which the
fall in trade would have been the same across product categories and
equal to the one of the reference group consumer nondurables, that is,
letting the significant interactions of product dummy coefficients with
TCt be equal to 0, delivers the following results: 21.47% of the export
10 We also estimated our export growth model separately for each of the
broad product categories. Results are omitted to save space but are avail-
able on request. Our estimates of the growth_rate_GDP coefficient are
in line with the ultimate conclusion of Baldwin (2009) that postponable
goods have been particularly hit by the negative demand shock affecting
tradables. More precisely, the difference-in-difference coefficient we obtain
when restricting the sample to consumer durables (0.0127) is higher than
that when restricting the sample to consumer nondurables (0.0022). Even
higher coefficients (0.0156 and 0.0186) are obtained in intermediates goods
and capital goods regressions, respectively.
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Table 4.—Changes in Firm-Level Exports-To-Turnover and Imports-To-Intermediates Ratios
Changes in Changes in
Export-to-Turnover Import-to-Intermediates
Variable Description Base DD Base DD
Dsize Size (in term of employment) of the firm 0.0936∗∗∗ −0.1020∗ 0.0502∗∗∗ −0.0859∗
(0.032) (0.052) (0.019) (0.032)
Dprod Value added per worker 0.0557∗ −0.0525 0.0263 0.0138
(0.03) (0.05) (0.018) (0.029)
Dinterm_share Share of intermediates over turnover 0.0442 −0.015 0.0583∗∗∗ −0.0710∗∗
(0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.028)
Dshare_exp_sales Share of exports over turnover −0.1290∗∗∗ −0.0188 −0.0116 0.0657
(0.031) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Dshare_imp_interm Share of imports over intermediates 0.0012 0.0219 −0.0187 −0.0978∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.049) (0.016) (0.027)
Dvalue_add_chain Exports times imports over turnover −0.0561 −0.0445 0.0209 −0.0953∗∗
(0.036) (0.058) (0.029) (0.048)
Dext_fin_dep Investments minus operating profits over investments −0.0826∗∗∗ 0.0654 0.0089 −0.0455
(0.029) (0.048) (0.017) (0.029)
Dshare_debts_o_liab Ratio of debts over total liabilities 0.0225 −0.0297 −0.011 0.0056
(0.028) (0.046) (0.017) (0.029)
Dshare_debts_due_after_one Share of debts due after one year 0.0513∗ −0.057 0.0108 −0.015
(0.03) (0.048) (0.018) (0.032)
Dshare_fin_debt Share of financial debt −0.026 −0.0129 −0.0031 0.0423
(0.03) (0.049) (0.019) (0.032)
Dshare_stock Ratio of stock over turnover 0.0372 −0.0105 0.0106 0.006
(0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.028)
for Foreign firm dummy −0.0986∗∗ 0.0872 −0.036 0.1283∗∗
(0.047) (0.071) (0.03) (0.056)
mne Multinational firm dummy 0.0813∗ −0.1055 0.035 −0.0432
(0.044) (0.072) (0.036) (0.061)
NACE dummies Yes Yes
Observations 16,610 28,371
R2 0.0177 0.0103
The “Base” column refers to coefficients of firm characteristics alone, while the “DD” column refers to coefficients of interactions of these characteristics with the trade collapse treatment time dummy TCt . Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
collapse is due to a more severe shock affecting postponable goods, the
equivalent figure for imports being 10.95%.
Last, it is worth noting that the difference-in-difference coefficient
of the Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation ( fraclib_diff) is
positive and significant for both export and import growth. This suggests
that more differentiated goods experienced a smaller fall in trade. In
particular, had the fall for differentiated goods been as hard as for other
goods, the export (import) drop would have been 21.47% (23.32%)
more severe.
IV. Trade Crisis or Trade Collapse?
Our findings thus far do not imply that there has been a trade crisis per
se. To investigate whether international trade suffered more than domes-
tic activity, we now examine in detail changes in exports-to-turnover
and imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm level. We complement
this analysis with evidence about firm-level exports-to-production and
imports-to-production ratios using the subsample of firms for which
production data are available for our period of analysis. The latter set
of results, given in Behrens et al. (2011), conveys the same message. It
is not reported here to save space.
Total manufacturing production value Belgium fell by 25% between
2008S1 and 2009S1, a figure that closely matches the 26% (28%) drop
in exports (imports) value over the same period. This simple evidence
already casts some doubts on the existence of a “trade crisis” in Bel-
gium. Nevertheless, there might still be compositional effects across
firms and industries, and those can provide valuable information on the
channels through which the fall in demand affected Belgian exports
and imports. We therefore now revisit this issue using a more detailed
microeconometric analysis.
To this end, we again use a difference-in-difference approach where
the treatment is the trade collapse. We first construct the log of the
firm-level ratio of exports-to-turnover (φtf ,X ) and imports-to-purchased
intermediates (φtf ,I ) in the first semester of year t as follows:
φtf ,X = log
(
Xtf
Turntf
)
and φtf ,I = log
(
I tf
Intetf
)
, (2)
where Turntf (Intetf ) denotes firm f ’s turnover (total purchases of inter-
mediates) and Xtf (I tf ) stands for exports (imports) aggregated at the
firm level. We consider 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1 and regress both
φt+1f ,X −φtf ,X andφt+1f ,I −φtf ,I on a constant, the posttreatment time dummy
variable TCt , the same set of (lagged) firm-level characteristics used in
the previous section, and interactions between firm-level characteristics
and TCt . We use OLS and provide robust standard errors.11
Table 4 reports our results for exports-to-turnover and imports-to-
intermediate purchases ratios. As can be seen from that table, only
the difference-in-difference coefficient of Dsize is significant in explain-
ing changes in exports-to-turnover ratios for the trade collapse period.
We may thus conclude that the negative effect of financial vari-
ables identified in the previous section has affected foreign trade and
domestic activity equally. Put differently, the credit crunch has not
11 We again also used (trade) weighted least squares to get a closer match
with aggregate figures. The results, given in Behrens et al. (2011), are almost
identical. We thus present only the unweighted results.
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disproportionately hurt the activity of trading across national borders
per se.
Turning to magnitudes, the differential effect of Dsize during the trade
collapse is rather small. Starting with an average exports-to-turnover
ratio of 0.3627 in 2008, large firms would see their ratio decrease by
0.3627 × 0.1020 = 0.0370 points. This is hardly strong evidence of a
major trade crisis. Turning to imports-to-intermediates ratios in table 4,
there is slightly more action, with five of the difference-in-difference
coefficients being significant. The positive value of for in column 6
points to foreign-owned firms increasing their imports-to-intermediates
ratios with respect to other firms during the collapse. However, three
measures of involvement in global value chains are significantly neg-
ative: Dinterm_share, Dshare_imp_interm, and Dvalue_add_chain. Again, given
the value of the coefficients, none of them implies stark changes in
imports-to-intermediates ratios. As for interactions of NACE dummies
with TCt , the reference industry being again Manufacture of Motor
Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers, they are generally insignificant.
For example, in both exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates
regressions, only 1 of the 22 manufacturing industry dummies has a
significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.
The fact that almost all coefficients in the exports-to-turnover,
imports-to-intermediates, exports-to- production, and imports-to-
production regressions are insignificant and that even when they are
not, their magnitude is small, leads us to conclude that it is not a trade
crisis, just a trade collapse caused by a strong decrease in the demand
for tradables that has equally affected domestic and foreign activity.
V. What Have We Learned?
A few clear results emerge from our analysis. First, the overwhelming
part of the trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin and is due
to a fall in average quantities and unit prices. Exporters and importers
showed remarkable resilience in foreign markets. There was no massive
exit, which may be explained by large sunk costs of entering foreign
markets that create an option value of remaining an exporter or an
importer during the crisis (Roberts & Tybout, 1997). Since most of the
adjustments took place at the intensive margin, Belgian trade expectedly
bounced back quickly after the collapse.12
Second, overall we find little support for supply-side-based expla-
nations of the trade collapse. On the one hand, GDP growth of the
destination countries is the most important determinant of trade growth
in our econometric analysis, explaining up to 54% of the fall in exports
and 45% of the fall in imports. This applies particularly to the demand
for durables and capital goods: trade in these categories fell systemati-
cally more, with a greater elasticity to GDP. While studies using more
aggregated data (Baldwin, 2009) or calibrated simulations (Eaton et al.,
2011) reach qualitatively and quantitatively similar conclusions, we are
not aware of any other firm-level analysis confirming these results to
date. On the other hand, few firm- or product-level characteristics are
systematically related to the fall in trade, especially when compared
with the fall in domestic operations. For instance, access to credit (as
proxied by financial balance sheet variables) can explain about 33%
of the fall in exports but has no explanatory power regarding exports-
to-turnover or exports-to-production ratios. In other words, financial
constraints affected foreign and domestic operations equally. Similarly,
involvement in global value chains, as measured by either the share of
imported intermediates or by export intensity, explains quantitatively
12 In June 2010, Belgium’s monthly exports exceeded the 2008S1 average
for the first time since the collapse. Monthly exports and imports were
quickly approaching their average precollapse level by late 2010.
some of the collapse of imports but has little explanatory power on
imports-to-intermediate or imports-to-production ratios.
To conclude, we point out two caveats of our analysis. As we acknowl-
edged, we do not observe the number of trading partners a firm has for
each product-market combination. The conclusion that trade collapsed
due to a price and quantity adjustment relies on the stability of this
“hidden” extensive margin, which we can only conjecture. Also, we
do not know to what extent our results generalize to other countries.
Developing countries might have been much more severely affected by
the credit crunch and the drying up of trade credit. This would cause
a larger fall in trade at the extensive margin there and make a quick
recovery less likely.
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